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INDIAN NATIONS AND THE HUMAN RIGHT TO
AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
The Honorable Tom Tsot
I. INTRODUCTION
I would like to approach the topic of Indian rights in the con-
text of international law from a new perspective. Currently, there
is uncertainty as to whether the proposed United Nations Declara-
tion of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples1 will be adopted. Given
that the Declaration is stalled in Geneva, and given the resistance
of states with large indigenous populations to the notion that in-
digenous peoples should have rights under international law, who
knows when, or if, the Declaration will be adopted. We cannot
wait.
This article will highlight United States and Indian-nation his-
tory in the development of Indian-nation law, and propose a new
approach. I submit that by establishing the independence of the
Indian-nation judiciary, the well being of the Indian people and
community will be improved.
II. UNITED STATES' REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
I would first like to focus on the United States' refusal to im-
plement and enforce international agreements that exist. Histori-
cally, the United States has not enforced the United Nations
agreements. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Declaration
has been stalled in Geneva for so many years. To illustrate the lack
of enforcement, the United States Senate ratified both the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 19922 and the Ge-
t Honorable Chief Justice Emeritus of the Navajo Nation. A shorter version of
this paper was presented at Bringing It Home: Building International Human Rights Law,
Advocacy, and Culture, A Conference to Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, held at the City University of New York School of Law, 1 May-3
May 1998.
1 See Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities, Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Eco-
nomic and Social Council, 46th Sess. at 103, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1994/56 (1994) [hereinafter Declaration].
2 U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAl. COVENANTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS 4, 21
(Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993) [hereinafter RATIFICATION]; Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force
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nocide Convention in 1989.' Despite the fact that international
treaties are the "supreme law of the land" under the treaty clause
of the United States Constitution,4 the Senate has not utilized
either agreement and as a result, neither one can be enforced in
court. Therefore, victims of genocide cannot enforce their own
rights. 5 Instead, these victims must wait for the Attorney General
of the United States to bring prosecutions,6 most likely against the
very officials the Attorney General defends in other cases. Thus,
the individuals whose rights are violated under the ICCPR and the
Genocide Convention have no means of recourse under the inter-
national instruments that are designed to protect them.
Despite their duties under the ICCPR, the United States is in
violation of its provisions.7 Specifically, the United States has taken
no action to implement Article 27 of the Covenant, which guaran-
tees indigenous peoples the right to "enjoy their own culture."'
Moreover, in Article 2(2) of the ICCPR, the United Nations ex-
pressed that the customary law of the right to enjoy culture in-
cludes the right of indigenous peoples to have their own law and
legal institutions.' Taking these provisions together, it is clear that
Mar. 23, 1976, entered intoforcefor the U.S.June 8, 1992, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) [here-
inafter ICCPR].
3 RATIFICATION, supra note 2, at 4 & n.4; Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9 1948, entered into force for
the U.S. Feb. 23, 1989, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Genocide Convention Implementation Act of
1987 (the Proxmire Act) 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1998).
4 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832) (stating
that the Constitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made,
to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties
with Indian nations, and consequently, admits their rank among those who are capa-
ble of making treaties). Id. at 519.
5 See BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGA-
TION IN U.S. COURTS 58-61 (1996).
6 See id.
7 See RATIFICATION, supra note 2, at 281-89.
8 Article 27 provides:
In those States in which ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own
language.
See also, James W. Zion, North American Indian Perspectives on Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSCIOUSNESS 191, 207-10
(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1991).
9 Article 2(2) of the Covenant provides:
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other meas-
ures, each State Part, to the present Covenant undertakes to take the
necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with
the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or
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the United States has a duty under the Covenant. It is also clear
through leading case law in the United States that these provisions
and duties have been breached. We can no longer wait for the
United States to carry out its duties.
Presently, there are massive violations of Indian rights in the
United States. Individual Indians are the victims of hate crimes,"1
and Indian nations are suffering at the hands of the United States
Courts and Congress. 1 Individual states are targeting Indian-na-
tion authority over issues of gaming, taxation, hunting and fishing,
economic development, land use regulation, and a wide range of
other issues. 2 The purpose of these attacks is to chip away at the
inherent powers of Indian nations so that they will eventually have
little political authority; except perhaps, to the extent of enroll-
ment, member conduct, member-on-member crimes, or child wel-
fare within the Indian nation.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
The origin of Indian law is derived from medieval European
law, canon, or church law.' 3 The first international law text, writ-
ten by Francisco de Vitoria, who is said to be the founder of inter-
national law, was about Indians. 4 In 1537, the Catholic Pope
issued a papal bull, Sublimis Deus, which highlighted the fact that
Indians have political, property, and liberty rights, and that any at-
tempt to take these rights away is absolutely null and void.' 5 Felix
S. Cohen, who is acknowledged as the "grandfather" of American
Indian law, stated that the exact language of the papal bull was
entered in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787-in its "utmost good
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recog-
nized in the present Covenant.
10 See Zion, supra note 8, at 208-11.
I See Fransesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious,
and Linguistic Minorities, Sub-Commision on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.78.xiv.1 (1979).
12 See Oliphant v. Siquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that In-
dian tribunals do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate non-Indians for crimes); Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that Indian nations have no inherent criminal
jurisdiction over Indians from other nations); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997) (holding that Indian tribunals have no inherent civil adjudicatory jurisdiction
over non-Indians).
13 See ROBERTA. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:
THE DIscOuRsES OF CONQUEST (1990); Suzan Shown Harjo, Native Peoples' Cultural and
Human Rights: An Unfinished Agenda, 24 Aajz. ST. L.J. 321, 321-24 (1992).
14 SeeWilliams, supra note 13, at 114-115 & n.135 (citing Felix S. Cohen, The Span-
ish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (1942)).
15 See Cohen, supra note 14, at 12.
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faith toward Indians" clause.' 6 These origins have been ultimately
ignored in the development of Indian case law in the United
States. American Indian law has changed a great deal over the past
two hundred years. The original idea, developed by Europeans,
was that Indian nations were sovereign "nations" unto themselves.
That is, they were states in the context of international law. 17
In 1945, the opinions of the United States Supreme Court un-
derwent a change. 8 That change continued throughout Supreme
Court decisions in later years. In 1973, the Court delivered its
opinion in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,19 stating
that Indian nation sovereignty was relevant only as a "backdrop"
against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be
read, indicating that the trend is "away from the idea of inherent
Indian sovereignty."2" The question remains: what is inherent sov-
ereignty or governmental power? The standard legal dictionary
definition of inherent power is: "[a] n authority possessed without
its being derived from another; [a] right, ability, or faculty of doing
a thing, without receiving that right, ability, or faculty from an-
other."' In other words, operating on your own power. But re-
cently, the United States Supreme Court has re-defined "inherent"
in its application to Indian nations.22 The court stated that "the
inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe" are only "those pow-
ers a tribe enjoys apart from express provision by treaty or
statute."
23
The Supreme Court later qualified attributes of Indian-nation
sovereignty by divesting it through "federal law or necessary impli-
cation of their dependent status. ' 24 It is curious that while Con-
gress has the sole authority to make Indian policy under the
Constitution, 25 the courts are stripping Indian nations of their au-
16 Cohen, supra note 14, at 12.
17 See Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study on Treaties, Agreements, and Other Con-
structive Arrangements Between States and Indigenous Populations: Second Progress Report,
47th Sess. at 21-22, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/27 (1995).
18 See Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
19 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
20 Id. at 172.
21 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 539 (Rev. 6th ed. 1991).
22 See Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1997).
23 Id. at 445.
24 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 152 (1980) (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)).
25 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate
Commerce .. .with the Indian Tribes[.]" The precise language of the "Indian Corn-
[Vol. 3:105
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thority by "implication." 26 For example, over the past few decades,
U.S. courts have stated that Indians do not have inherent criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such
powers by Congress;27 Indians do not have inherent adjudicatory
jurisdiction in civil actions against non-Indians; 28 and Indians do
not have inherent regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians. 29
Under prior law, Indian-nation jurisdiction could not be chal-
lenged in court because of sovereign immunity. Yet, this changed
with the revision of federal judicial procedure,") and thereafter In-
dian-nation jurisdiction could be challenged." While the Supreme
Court has established that litigants must exhaust their tribal reme-
dies before going to federal court,12 the federal courts are consist-
ently overturning Indian-nation court determinations of their own
jurisdiction.
IV. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE INDIAN-NATION
Given the systematic deprivation of Indian rights and sover-
eignty, it is not surprising that Indians as a people, and a commu-
nity, have not fared well. Indians as a people are poor. The 1980
and 1990 censuses show that the poverty rate for American Indians
has remained considerably higher than that of the total popula-
tion.34 In 1989, 31 percent of American Indian persons lived below
the poverty level, up from 27 percent in 1979. The national pov-
erty rate was about 13 percent in 1989 and 12 percent in 1979.
That alone should be a basis for the human right to a decent life.
Sadly, Indian nations attempted to respond to poverty by satis-
fying peoples' vices. Tribal enterprises now sell tax-free cigarettes
merce Clause" shows that Congress only has the power to regulate commerce with
Indian Tribes, not the power to regulate them.
26 See Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. at 134.
27 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). See also Duro
v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990).
28 See A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. at 446.
29 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557, 564 (1981).
30 See28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1995).
31 See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851-
53 (1985).
32 Id. at 856-57.
33 See Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of Disappearing Federal jurisdiction Over Fed-
eral Enforcement of Federal Law: A Vehicle for Reassessment of the Tribal Exhaustion/Absten-
tion Doctrine, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 531 (1996).
34 See L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96
COLUM. L. Rv. 809, 825 & n.103, 830 & nn.134, 135 (1996) (citing L. Scott Gould,
The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising Sovereignty and the Constitu-
tion, 28 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 53, 57 & n.8 (1994)).
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and alcohol. Additionally, many members of Indian nations oper-
ate casinos. However, the sale of tax free cigarettes to non-Indians
was abolished in an unprecedented decision.35 A few years later, a
similar decision was handed down with regard to tax-free alcohol. 6
Without other opportunities for economic development, members
of Indian nations find it difficult to do anything but cater to vices.
In the United States, Indian-nation authority has eroded over
the past several years. Senator Slade Gorton of Washington is com-
pounding the erosion of Indian-nation sovereignty by advancing
the proposition that because Indian nations are not collecting state
taxes from non-Indians, but are paying state taxes, Indian-nation
sovereign immunity should be removed.3 7 This removal of sover-
eignty would subject Indian nations to suit in state courts." Two
problems exist with this approach. First, it is simply bad policy to
impose a tax based upon someone's ethnicity. Second, this propo-
sition is unworkable because store clerks cannot tell if someone is a
non-Indian by looking at them and cannot ask because it is inap-
propriate and perpetuates racism.
New conflicts and tensions were recently created when Con-
gress passed Indian gaming legislation in response to a court deci-
sion, which said that Indian nations can allow gambling.39 This
illustrates how Indian-nation authority has eroded in recent years.
In the face of these events, what does the Court in an Indian-nation
do?
V. UTILIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO ESTABLISH AN
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
The judicial system is the backbone of any government, be-
cause it determines peoples' rights and prescribes remedies.
Therefore, on a most fundamental level, the court must enforce
criminal law and offer the public remedies for wrongs. Yet, despite
35 See Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,
425 U.S. 463, 479-83 (1976).
36 See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1983).
37 See Dodie Manuel, Education is the Key to the Sovereignty Battle, ENWAAAN, Au-
Authm Action News 1, Apr. 30, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11285537; Billy Frank, Jr.,
American Indian Equal Justice Act is Not Equa ENWICTY, INDIAN COUNrRY TODAY,
LAKOTA TimEs, Apr. 13, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 18037009.
38 See Rehner, 463 U.S. at 713.
30 See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994); California
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (holding that as state law
did not explicitly prohibit a form of gambling completely, Indian tribes could run
games according to their own regulations, ignoring state or local laws concerning
hours of operation, betting limits, and other similar details).
110 [Vol. 3:105
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the judicial system's capacity to effect great change, more needs to
be done.
While non-Indian-nation courts can protect the people within
their territorial jurisdiction, Indian-nation courts are generally not
permitted to do so and instead operate within a very limited juris-
diction. We must look now upon the concepts and instruments in
international human rights law that may shed light on these con-
flicts and difficulties.
The customary international law of judicial independence is
extensive and clear.' Several international human rights concepts
and instruments exist that may affect the judicial independence of
the Indian-nation. The 1945 Charter of the United Nations 4' was
designed to "establish conditions under which justice and respect
for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of interna-
tional law can be maintained."4 '2 That language is equally applica-
ble to treaties with Indians and other indigenous peoples.
Moreover, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights43 re-
quires an "independent and impartial" tribunal to assure a fair trial
and a public hearing.44 Furthermore, the ICCPR specifically en-
shrines judicial rights as a matter of law.45 If used correctly, these
instruments can aid in the establishment of an independentjudici-
ary in Indian nations.
In 1985, the United Nations adopted the Basic Principles on
the Independence of the Judiciary." This document recommends
that the basic principles of judicial independence are guaranteed
by all of the states, including the United States.47 Additionally, a
1996 report to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
40 See generally, Mauro Cappelletti, "Wo Watches the Watchmen?" A Comparative Study
on Judicial Responsibility, 31 Am.J. COMP. L. 1 (1983) (discussing both judicial indepen-
dence and responsibility in countries with civil law, common law, and socialist legal
traditions); Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoret-
ical and Conceptional Analysis, 44 Am. J. COMp. L. 605 (1996) (discussing the link be-
tween judicial independence and democracy).
41 U.N. CHARTER, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945; WJ.F.M. VAN DER WOLF, HUMAN
RIGHTS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 10 (1994).
42 United Nations Background Note, Independence of theJudiciary: A Human Rights Prior-
ity, <http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1837e.htm> (published by the U.N. Dep't of Pub-
lic Information DPI/1837/HR, Aug. 1996) [hereinafter Background Note].
43 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
44 See Background Note, supra note 42.
45 See ICCPR, supra note 2, at pt. II, art. 11 (3) (a) (b) (c).
46 U.N. DEP'T OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, SEVENTH U.N. CON-
GRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS at 59-62, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No.E.86.IV.1 (1986).
47 Id. at 60.
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addresses the independence of the judiciary emphasizing its im-
portance "for the maintenance of the rule of law and the protec-
tion of human rights."48
Many Indian nations are criticized for not being democratic,
but a corporate model of government was imposed on them under
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,4" and Indian courts have
not received the support they need to have the judicial indepen-
dence which would assure a democratic government and process.50
The United States policy on Indian judicial independence flies in
the face of many fundamental international considerations, be-
cause the United States Congress and the courts have limited In-
dian-nation jurisdiction to a great extent. For example, the Navajo
Nation court system is the largest in the United States. It serves a
population of over 225,000 people 51 who are spread over 25,000
square miles; an area larger than the state of West Virginia. 52 Yet
there are only seven Navajo Nation judicial districts53 with fourteen
trial judges and three Supreme CourtJustices. 54 Aside from having
the Indian courts' jurisdiction reduced by judicial fiat, the courts
are under constant attack and receive little support from the
United States.55
Although Congress passed the Indian Tribal Justice Act of
199356 to shift more funding to Indian-nation courts, it has not ap-
propriated one penny for ongoing court operations. The Navajo
Nation Justices and Judges are frequently the focus of criticism as a
result of their inability to prosecute non-Indian offenders and to
sentence Indian offenders to jail. Moreover, judges are frustrated
by the inability to operate as courts of general jurisdiction with the
48 Dat6 Param Cumaraswamy, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of
Judges and Lauyers, Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of
Detention orlmprisonment, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, 52nd Sess., Agenda Item 8,
at 57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/37 (1996).
4) Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1988).
50 See Nell J. Newton, Let A Thousand Policy-Flowers Bloom: Making Indian Policy in the
Twenty-First Centuy, 46 ARK. L. REv. 25, 28-30 (1993).
51 THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 566 (Robert Famighetti et al. eds.,
1999).
52 See DAVID E. WILKINS, Diwt. BIBEEHAZ' AANII: A HANDBOOK OF NAVAJO GOVERN-
MENT (1987); Katherine J. Wise, A Matter of Trust: The Elimination of Federally Funded
Legal Services on the Navajo Nation, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 157, 157-67 (1997).
53 See ChiefJustice Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARJz.
L. REV. 225, 227 (1989).
54 See NATION CODE tit. 7, § 301(A) (Equity 1995).
55 See Newton, supra note 50, at 38-45.
56 Indian Tribal Justice Act of 1993, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-14 (1994).
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authority to handle all the problems that arise within the Navajo
Nation.
VI. CONCLUSION
I know from personal experience that the job of an Indian-
nation judge is very frustrating and discouraging. Aside from the
normal difficulties of acting as ajudge, such as complex legal issues
or high caseloads, we are confronted with situations in which non-
Indian offenders get away with their crimes and corporate defend-
ants evade their responsibilities to Indian nations. While there is
legislation before Congress that would permit non-Indians to sue
Indian nations in a state court, this legislation is deeply flawed be-
cause it is not reciprocal: Indians are not usually permitted to sue
non-Indians in the appropriate Indian court.
I suggest that this situation cries out to heaven as a violation of
basic human rights. If we cannot protect our people and those
who live with us in Indian Country, victims will continue to exist.
There are still many victims who are left unprotected. For exam-
ple, non-Indians who beat their Navajo spouse or significant other
are not prosecuted in our jurisdiction; Indians who sue non-Indi-
ans in an Indian-nation court for torts or consumer law violations
must spend a great deal in time and money to defend against juris-
dictional challenges to obtaining relief. Congress has failed to
fund promised programs to protect victims of family violence, or
child abuse, or neglect. As a result, people are being injured and
killed." Surely that violates other international law norms.
Indians and their nations have the right to self-determination
and human rights in the Helsinki Accords,58 the document that
formally ended World War II. Most people are not aware that
there is a report in the Accords on Indian rights. 59 The report
states that the United States agrees that Indians and their nations
57 See Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention Act of 1990, 25
U.S.C. §§ 3201-3210 (1994). This Act stated that funds for Indian-nation child protec-
tion and violence prevention programs are inadequate. Additionally, it authorized
funds for mental health treatment for Indian victims of child abuse and family vio-
lence on Indian reservations. As of yet, no funds have been authorized in appropria-
tions to address the congressional "promise" of funding. This is particularly
surprising because the Act makes strong findings about the need to fund such pro-
grams. See id. § 3201.
58 See CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Vol. LXXIII, No. 1888, at 323, 325-26, Sept. 1, 1975.
59 See generally Harjo, supra note 13 at 324 & n.12, cited in COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, FULFILLING OUR PROMISES: THE UNITED STATES AND THE
HELSINKI FINAL ACT 163 (1979).
1998]
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
have basic human rights and the right to self-determination.6
The laws exist. Indian nations clearly have significant rights to
handle their own affairs, solve their own problems, and protect
their own populations. The only remaining question is whether
the United States, which speaks often of human rights issues, will
honor the human rights of Indians. I suggest that despite a lack of
progress in adopting new international standards for the human
rights of indigenous peoples, a good start would be to honor other
international human rights that are more firmly established. I call
on all of you to stop the theft of Indian-nation powers and to speak
with us as we ask that the basic right to an independent Indian
judiciary be observed in the United States.
60 See Hajo, supra note 13 at 324.
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